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THE 1976 JAMES McCORMICK MITCHELL LECTURE
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
A PLEA FOR UTILIZING FOREIGN EXPERIENCE*
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER**
INTRODUCTION
C omparison of different systems of criminal procedure can serve
a variety of purposes.' With an emphasis on similarities among
the legal systems under consideration, the object may be to find a
common core of legal solutions and institutions. This, for instance,
was one of the main purposes of the studies and negotiations con-
ducted by representatives of the Big Four Allied Powers in prepa-
ration for the Nuremberg trials. It is not, however, the purpose
of this lecture.
More frequently, comparative research in the area of criminal
procedure will focus on differences rather than similarities. Differ-
ences, if at all significant, call for explanations.4 The purpose of
such comparative studies may be to explain the differences in
terms of their historical roots or in terms of the ideologies and
policies underlying the divergent rules and institutions. Again,
I must confess that-although historical explanations occasionally
will be alluded to-explanation is not my principal objective today.
* Presented to the Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York
at Buffalo, on October 14, 1976.
** Professor of Law at the Hastings College of the Law, University of California;
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and Comparative Law Emeritus,
Cornell University Law School. D. Jur., Munich, Germany, 1933; LL.B., Columbia Uni-
versity, 1942.
1. For a general discussion of the purposes to be served by comparative legal
studies, see R. B. SCHLESINGER, COMPAATiVE LAIW 4-37 (3d ed. 1970). See also Winterton,
Comparative Law Teaching, 23 Am. J. COMP. L. 69 (1975).
2. The purposes and techniques of modem "common core" research are discussed
in 1 R.B. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CoNTRAcTs-A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF
LEGAL SYSTEMS 5-58 (1968).
3. See Bull, Nuremberg Trial, 7 F.R.D. 175 (1948).
4. For a discussion strongly (and perhaps too exclusively) emphasizing explanation
as an essential objective of comparative studies, see Merryman, Comparative Law and
Scientific Explanation, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECH-
NOLOGICAL REVOLUTiON 81 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974).
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Another possible object of comparison, and especially of multi-
lateral comparison, is the construction of models in order to clarify
the important and typical features of several groups of systems.5 As
attempts to escape from the tyranny of unmanageably numerous
details, such models may be valuable; but in the area of criminal
procedure the modelbuilder encounters exceptionally great diffi-
culties, partly of a semantic nature. The more obvious labels to
be pinned on the models-especially "inquisitorial" and "accusa-
torial," and to some extent even "adversary" and "nonadversary"
-have been employed so inconsistently that their meaning has
become blurred.0 Despite these terminological obstacles, some
comparativists-notably Professor Damaska-recently have made
real progress in such modelbuilding endeavors.7 Again, however,
I must disclaim any intention to contribute to these endeavors
here and now.
The purpose of this brief lecture is simpler and less ambitious,
but it requires no apology. Ever since Solon of Athens traveled to
the other Greek city-states and studied their laws in order to bene-
fit from their experience while he was drafting new laws for his
own people, comparative studies have been undertaken for the
pragmatic purpose of gaining perspective in critically appraising
one's own domestic law. Historically, this is doubtless the oldest of
the various objectives to which comparative studies can be di-
rected 8 In line with this ancient tradition of my craft, I shall ex-
plore a few aspects of our law of criminal procedure that, in the
light of comparable foreign solutions, appear to me to be intoler-
ably archaic, inefficient, unjust, and indeed perverse.
5. Such models constructed on the basis of comparative studies must of course be
distinguished from models designed to identify conflicting tendencies within a single
legal system, such as the late Herbert Packer's "crime control" and "due process" models.
Both of Packer's models, despite their seeming contrasts, are tied to traditional common
law thinking. See Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
6. A less obvious but perhaps more promising approach to modelbuilding might
be predicated on the different relative strengths-within various systems of criminal
procedure-of the value of truth and of competing "other values." See text accompanying
notes 97-100 infra.
7. See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. Rsv. 506 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Damaska, Barriers]; Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Pro.
cedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Damaska, Structures]. See also
Damaska, Comparative Reflections on Reading the Amended Yugoslav Code: Interroga-
tion of Defendants in Yugoslav Criminal Procedure, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 168 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Damaska, Reflections].
8. See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 8.
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I realize that I have only a small chance of converting
my listeners and readers to my thesis. American lawyers, and
Americans generally, as a rule are far from arrogant and are
genuinely willing to learn from foreign experience; but when it
comes to problems of criminal procedure, they are possessed by a
feeling of superiority that seems to grow in direct proportion to
the ever-increasing weight of the accumulating evidence demon-
strating the total failure of our system of criminal justice. In large
part, this feeling of superiority is caused by plain ignorance con-
cerning the details and even the basic nature of the leading foreign
systems. A number of seasoned observers, including Judges Walter
Schaefer 9 and Marvin Frankel,0 have commented in recent years
on the blindness with which many American lawyers cling to the
unfounded belief that modern systems of criminal procedure in
civil law countries are still wholly "inquisitorial" and that there-
fore no part of these systems can be fitted into our allegedly
"adversary" criminal process. 1
This belief, which generates an attitude of unthinking con-
tempt toward foreign systems, is 200 years out of date. As a result
of the teachings of 18th-century thinkers such as Montesquieu,
and of events set in motion by the French Revolution, most con-
tinental legal systems long ago adopted the very centerpiece of the
common law adversary process: the jury trial in criminal cases.'"
It is true, of course, that in the body of a civilian system this trans-
plant from English law was bound to undergo considerable modi-
fication; and this is indeed what happened in most continental
countries. 3 The important point to remember, however, is that
some of the central principles and institutions in the present-day
continental systems of criminal procedure ultimately stem from
the same source as our own criminal process. Moreover, many of
the continental countries, by adhering to the European Conven-
9. See W. SCHAEFER, THE SusPEar AND Socirry 70-71 (1967).
10. See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. REV.
1031, 1053 (1975).
11. In reality, there are many (and very important) nonadversary elements in
our present-day system of criminal procedure. See Goldstein, Reflections on Two
Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009
(1974).
12. See, e.g., G. MUELLER & F. La POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 7-8 (1969).
13. See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 343; Mannheim, Trial by Jury in
Modern Continental Criminal Law (pts. 1-2), 53 L.Q. REv. 99, 388 (1937); text accom-
panying note 25 infra.
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tion on Human Rights, have subjected themselves to general
standards of procedural fairness quite comparable to our due
process notions. 14 Civilian systems of criminal procedure thus are
not basically alien to our own traditions, and no serious ideological
barrier has to be crossed when we compare their solutions with
our own.
15
Of course, one who advocates that we borrow, or in any event
learn from, foreign solutions must proceed with caution. Before we
select a particular foreign institution as a worthy source of inspira-
tion, we must know its position and function within the entire
scheme of the foreign system. 6 For this reason, I shall first try to
provide an overall thumbnail sketch of a typical criminal pro-
ceeding in one of the more enlightened civil law countries, with
apologies for over-condensation forced upon me by the limited
time at my disposal. This will be followed by a more detailed com-
parative discussion of a few institutions recommended for further
study.
I. OUTLINE OF THE COURSE OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
IN A CONTINENTAL COUNTRY
In the civilian systems,17 as in our own, the policeman nor-
mally is the first public official to arrive at the scene of an alleged
crime, or to receive a report concerning it. He may conduct an
informal investigation; but his power to arrest the suspect with-
out a judicial warrant,' or to proceed to warrantless searches and
14. See, e.g., Linke, The Influence of the European Convention of Human Rights
on National European Criminal Proceedings, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 397 (1971).
15. All of the countries to whose laws more than passing reference is made in
the present paper are located this side of what used to be called the Iron Curtain.
Hence it is not necessary to address here the question of whether and to what extent
ideological barriers might make it more difficult for us to utilize experience gained in
the socialist systems. For comparative discussion of criminal procedure systems belong-
ing to the common law, civil law and socialist orbits, see the articles by Damaska cited in
note 7 supra.
16. See Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to
Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. Rev. 1067, 1075 (1975).
17. The reader who is interested in details will have to utilize not only the
comparative literature cited throughout this article, but also single-country studies,
many of which are available in English. For some references, see R.B. SCHLESINOER, supra
note 1, at 339-42. See also Rosett, Trial and Discretion in Dutch Criminal Justice, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 353 (1972); Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in
Comparison with American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239 (1970).
18. See G. MUELLER & F. IE PooLE-GawrrHs, supra note 12, at 14-19. See also text
accompanying notes 36-42 infra.
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seizures, generally is more limited than here. Thus, at least as a
rule, it becomes necessary at a very early stage of the investigation
to involve the prosecutor and the court.19
There is no grand jury. The official phase of the pretrial
investigation is in the hands of a judge-whom the French call
juge d'instruction-or of the prosecutor. Both the judge and the
prosecutor are essentially civil servants.20 The judge enjoys the
usual guarantees of judicial independence. The prosecutor does
not; he may be a link in a hierarchical chain of command, often
leading up to the Minister of Justice. Nevertheless, except perhaps
in cases having strong political overtones, the civil-servant prose-
cutor operating in a continental system can be expected to be
reasonably impartial.21 He does not have to run for re-election;
and his promotion within the civil service hierarchy may depend
as much on his efficiency in sorting out and dropping investi-
gations mistakenly commenced against innocent suspects as it does
on his record of procuring convictions of the guilty.2
The magistrate or prosecutor conducting the investigation
will build up an impressive dossier by interrogating all available
witnesses, including those named by the suspect, and collecting
other relevant evidence. The suspect himself will be interrogated,
and in the most progressive continental countries such interroga-
tion will take place in the presence of his counsel. In many civil
law countries the law expressly provides that the suspect has a right
to remain silent and that he must be informed of this right2 3 Of
course, there is no physical compulsion to make him talk. Experi-
ence in continental countries shows, nevertheless, that in the pre-
liminary investigation as well as at the trial itself the defendant
usually does talk. The reasons for this will be explored below.
19. See, e.g., Scaparone, Police Interrogation in Italy, 1974 CRIM. L. REv. 581;
text accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
20. See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 118-20. See also G. MUELLER & F.
LE PooLE-GxuFrrHs, supra note 12, at 113.
21. See, e.g., Linke, supra note 14, at 412.
22. In many of the continental systems, moreover, the discretionary powers of
the prosecutor are much more narrowly circumscribed than in this country. See
Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 468 (1974); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 439 (1974).
23. See, e.g., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] §§ 136, 246, as re-promulgated by Law
of Jan. 7, 1975, [1975] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 129 (W. Ger.). See also text
accompanying note 73 infra.
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At the conclusion of the official investigation, the prosecutor
(or, in some countries, the investigating magistrate) must decide
whether in his judgment the evidence is strong enough to warrant
the bringing of formal charges against the suspect. If charges are
brought, the accused still does not necessarily have to stand trial.
Under the traditional civil law practice, the dossier now goes to a
three-judge panel-on a higher level of the judicial hierarchy. Only
if this panel, having studied the dossier and having given defense
counsel an opportunity to submit arguments and to suggest the
taking of additional evidence, determines that there exists what
we would call "reasonable cause," will the accused have to stand
trial.2 4 (It should be noted here how misleading it can be to call
the continental procedure "inquisitorial" and to contrast it with
our allegedly "adversary" process. Under continental procedure,
the accused has a two-fold opportunity to be heard-first in the
course of the preliminary investigation, and again when the three-
judge panel examines the dossier-before any decision is made
whether he has to stand trial. This should be compared with the
completely nonadversary grand jury proceeding by which a prose-
cutor under our system can obtain an indictment.)
In every civil law country, counsel for the accused has the
absolute right to inspect the whole dossier. This will be discussed
later.
At the trial, the bench normally (though not uniformly) will
consist of one or three professional judges and a number of lay
assessors. The jury system, which was introduced in continental
Europe in the wake of the French Revolution, more recently was
replaced in most continental countries by the system of the mixed
bench.25 Under this system, the professional judges and the lay
assessors together form the court, which as a single body passes on
issues of law as well as fact, and determines both guilt and sen-
tence. Thus, the trial does not have to be bifurcated into a first
hearing devoted solely to the issue of guilt, and a subsequent
second hearing dealing with the sentence. The issue of guilt and
the measure of punishment are determined simultaneously and by
the same body of adjudicators.
24. See Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory
Analysis, 23 LA. L. Rav. 1, 23 (1962).
25. See R.B. ScHLEsiNGER, supra note 1, at 343; Damaska, Structures, at 492-93.
For a thorough study of the system of the mixed bench, see Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges
in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 135 (1972).
[Vol. 26
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The dossier, reflecting the pretrial investigation, plays a role
during the trial as well. Three of the dramatis personae at this
point are thoroughly conversant with its contents: the prosecutor,
the defendant's counsel, and the Presiding Justice. The Presiding
Justice has the dossier in front of him during the trial. On the
other hand, the lay judges, and often the professional judges other
than the Presiding Justice of the court, are unfamiliar with the
dossier. Consequently, only the evidence received in open court
(as distinguished from the contents of the dossier) may be con-
sidered in reaching a decision.
After a reading of the charges, the Presiding Justice normally
will call upon the defendant to give his name and occupation and
to make a statement concerning his general background .2  Then,
after a warning that.he has the right, at his option, to remain
silent concerning the charges against him, 27 the defendant will be
asked what (if anything) he wishes to say about the charges.2 The
defendant, who is not put under oath,29 at this point has the
opportunity to tell his side of the story by way of a coherent
statement. This will be followed by questions addressed to the
defendant. In practice most of the questioning will be done by the
Presiding Justice, who is well prepared for this task by previous
study of the dossier in his hands. Prosecution and defense counsel
may suggest, or be permitted to ask, additional questions.
After this interrogation of the defendant, the witnesses will
be examined in similar fashion. Normally, the witnesses will be
the same individuals whose preliminary testimony is recorded in
the dossier, but additional witnesses, not discovered in the course
of the pretrial investigation, may be subpoenaed by the defense
or may appear voluntarily at the trial. Nontestimonial evidence,
especially physical evidence, also may be produced, and the court
may inspect the place of the crime.
No technical rules of evidence impede the process of proof-
taking.
26. See, e.g., STPO § 243 (4).
27. See id.
28. The trial described in this and the following three paragraphs of the text
reflects the applicable code provisions. In practice, many of the steps outlined in the
text can be omitted or condensed in cases where a confession has been obtained, that
is, in the great majority of routine cases. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
29. For a broad-based historical and comparative discussion of the oath require-
ment, see Silving, The Oath (pts. 1-2), 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1527 (1959).
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After closing arguments by prosecution and defense, and after
the defendant has been accorded the last word, the court retires to
deliberate. The lay judges, whose vote in most (but not all) con-
tinental countries carries the same weight as that of their profes-
sional colleagues, may outnumber the latter.30 In the great majority
of civil law countries, the judgment does not have to be unani-
mous; and the fact that it is not unanimous will not be disclosed.
Unless the judgment is one of acquittal, it will pronounce con-
viction and sentence. It will say, for example, that defendant is
found guilty of armed robbery and for such crime is sentenced
to four years in the reformatory.
As a rule, the judgment of the court of first instance is subject
to an appeal on both the law and the facts.81 New evidence may be
presented to the appellate court, and the proceedings before that
court, which has power to review the sentence as well as the
determination of guilt or innocence, may amount to a trial de
novo. The decision of the appellate court normally can be attacked
by a second appeal to a court of last resort, but in this last court
only questions of law will be reviewed. The right to appeal is
given not only to the defendant but to the prosecutor as well.82
30. It has been argued, however, that the purposes of lay participation-to keep
the professional judges from performing their tasks too routinely, and to increase popular
confidence in the administration of justice-can be attained without having the lay
members of the panel outnumber (and conceivably outvote) the professional judges.
This argument, coupled with the further consideration that historically the inclusion of
a lay element in criminal tribunals is but a surviving remnant of the 19th-century trans-
plantation of the English jury trial into the continental systems, recently led the West
German Legislature to adopt an important change in the law. Until 1974, the trial court
that dealt with the gravest crimes consisted of three professional judges and six lay
assessors, but a 1974 amendment, now embodied in GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESFTZ [GVG]
§ 76, as re-promulgated by Law of May 9, 1975, [1975] BGB1 I 1077 (W. Ger.), reduced
the number of lay assessors to two. See 1 LOEwE-ROSENBERG, DE SThAFPRoZESSORI)NUNo
Uvi nAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGEsErz, Introduction, ch. 15, annos. 6-9 (23d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as LOEWE-ROSENBERG (23d ed.)]. The statement in the text is still
correct with respect to other continental countries.
31. In some continental countries, there are exceptions to this rule: the decisions
of the courts dealing with the gravest crimes sometimes are subject to an appeal only on
points of law. See G. MUELLER & F. LE PooLE-GrIFFITHS, supra note 12, at 210. These
presently illogical exceptions can be explained only on historical grounds. They date
back to the 19th-century period when an English-style system of jury trials (which of
course precluded appellate review of the jury's express or implied factual findings)
prevailed on the continent.
32. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), upholding the constitutionality
of a statute permitting appeals by the state in criminal cases, Mr. Justice Cardozo called
attention to the practice of civil law countries, where the prosecutor generally has the
right to appeal from an acquittal or even from a judgment of conviction if he regards
the sentence as too mild. See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 6. More recently, how-
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In concluding this brief overview, I should like to stress again
that it is too highly abbreviated to be totally accurate, and that it
does not make sufficient allowance for the considerable differences
that exist among the various civil law systems of criminal pro-
cedure. My hope is that despite such over-generalization I have
been able to highlight some of the important features that are
common to a number of the civil law systems and set them apart
from our procedure.
II. ARmRST AND PRETRIAL DETENTION IN
CIIL-LAW COUNTRIES
With the above comments as a background, let me now turn
to a discussion of some of the procedural devices and arrangements
to be found in civil law countries that might provide American
reformers with food for thought.
The first two items-treated together because they are so
closely connected-are arrest and pretrial detention.
In this country, it is still the general rule that criminal pro-
ceedings routinely "start with the harsh, and in itself degrading,
measure of physical arrest."3 In the federal courts, and in less than
one-half of the states, this brutal and (as a rule) unnecessary rou-
tine has been modified by statutory provisions that in certain
situations authorize the issuance of a summons in lieu of arrest.3 4
But these modifications are halfhearted; frequently they are limited
to cases of minor violations, and most of the relevant provisions
leave it to the discretion of the police or the prosecutor whether a
summons should take the place of physical arrest 5
ever, the Supreme Court has shown itself more parochial and has paid little attention
to standards of fairness developed in the criminal procedure of other countries. In
line with this more recent attitude of the Court, the Palko holding has come under attack.
The extent to which it must be regarded as overruled has been staked out by a triad of
recent cases: United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); United States v. Jenkins,
420 U.S. 358 (1975) ; and Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). Although at least
in part overruled, Palko still seems to exert some influence from its grave. See United
States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. Cohn, "Criminal Records"-A Comparative Approach, 4 GA. J. Irrr. CoM r. L.
116 (1974).
34. See FED. R. Crat. P. 4, 9, as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370
(1975). As to state law, see Feeney, Citation in Lieu of Arrest, 25 VAND. L. Rzv. 867
(1972); LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8, 12.
35. Current reform proposals are conveniently collected and surveyed by D.
ErsmiN & D. AuSTERN, UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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The civil law countries, on the other hand, unanimously
recognize that the initiation of a judicial proceeding, whether civil
or criminal, never requires the defendant's physical arrest. It fol-
lows, according to civilian thinking, that the necessary notification
of the defendant is to be effected by a summons, in criminal as
well as civil proceedings,o and that it is unthinkable to use physical
arrest as a routine measure against a suspect who has not yet been
tried and who, consequently, must be presumed innocent."'
The question whether a suspect should be detained pending
trial is, in the civilians' view, completely separate and distinct from
the routine of initiating the proceeding. Such detention is regarded
as the exception rather than the rule. Except in carefully defined
emergency situations, a judicial order is required to detain the
suspect before trial.38 The requirements for the issuance of such
an order are strict. In West Germany, for instance, it can be
issued only if the court, by definite findings of fact, determines that
the following three elements exist: First, there must be strong
reasons for believing that the suspect has committed the crime.8
Second, the evidence before the court must show a specific, rational
ground for pretrial detention, such as danger of flight or danger
of tampering with the evidence.40 Third, such detention must
meet the requirement of proportionality; that is, it will not be
SECTION COMPARISON 7-15 (1975). These proposals, if adopted, would bring about sub-
stantial improvement. Unfortunately, however, it appears that American legislators gen-
erally continue to impose severe restrictions on the use of a summons in lieu of arrest,
even though experience has shown that very few of the defendants thus summoned (or
released after an initial arrest) fail to appear at the trial. See Baron, Workshop:
Establishing Bail Projects, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 42, 45; Feeney, supra note 34, at 374-79. See
also articles cited note 44 infra.
The strength of the continuing opposition to a more liberal use of the summons
procedure is illustrated by the history of recent attempts to reform rules 4 and 9 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the early 1970's, the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States drafted, and in 1974
the Supreme Court promulgated, a much liberalized version of these rules. See H.R. REP.
No. 94-247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
674-77; cf. Frankel, Bench Warrants Upon the Prosecutor's Demand: A View from the
Bench, 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 403, 415 (1971). But the opposition to this revision prevailed
when rules 4 and 9 received their present form in Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975).
36. See LOEwE-RosENBERG (23d ed.), Introduction, ch. 13, annos. 79-82.
37. See G. MUELLER & F. LE PooLE-GRIFFrrHS, supra note 12, at 15-19.
88. See id. at 93-101.
39. STPO § 112 (1), first sentence.
40. Id. § 112(2). In homicide cases, this requirement is eliminated. In cases
involving certain other types of very serious crimes the suspect may be detained upon a
finding that he would be likely to commit similar offenses if he were released. Id.
§§ 112(3), 112a.
MITCHELL LECTURE
ordered if the hardship caused by it is disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense.4 1 The order, which must state the grounds
on which each of these requirements is thought to be met, is sub-
ject to immediate appeal.4
Compare this rational system of pretrial detention to our
traditional bail procedure, still prevailing in the majority of
states, under which the wealthy suspect will be released even
though he is likely to flee or to intimidate witnesses, while the
indigent defendant will be kept in jail despite the absence of any
rational justification for detaining him. It is true that recently,
through the 1966 Federal Bail Reform Act 43 and similar legislation
in a minority of states, 44 we have made some progress in this area.
But note that the provisions of the federal Act as well as those of
state statutes authorizing so-called "Own Recognizance" (O.R.)
releases normally become operative only after the suspect has been
subjected to the (frequently unnecessary) indignity of the initial
arrest.4 Note further that-again in contrast to continental prac-
tice-an application for "O.R." release may be denied without any
statement of reasons, and that at least in some of the jurisdictions
in question the burden is upon the arrestee to show good cause
why he should be released.46 It follows, I submit, that even in our
most liberal jurisdictions something might yet be gained by com-
parative study of the subject of arrest and pretrial detention.47
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S AND THE DEFENDANT'S CONTRIBUTION
TO THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
The two remaining topics I should like to discuss have one
feature in common: both of them bear, directly and importantly,
41. Id. § 112 (1), second sentence. See also id. § 113 (precluding pretrial detention
in most of the cases in which the maximum sentence does not exceed six months).
42. Id. §§ 114, 117. According to the latter section, the detainee also has the
right at any time to demand a judicial inquiry into the continuing existence of all the
requirements for detention.
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1970).
44. See, e.g., Berger, Bail in Missouri Revisited, 43 U.M.K.C.L. Rv. 40 (1974);
Murphy, Revision of State Bail Laws, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 451 (1971); Snouffer, An Article of
Faith Abolishes Bail in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. Rxv. 273 (1974); Comment, Trends in Own
Recognizance Releases: From Manhattan to California, 5 PAc. L.J. 675 (1974).
45. See notes 43 8: 44 supra.
46. E.g., Kawaichi v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 461, 126 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1975).
47. The reform proposals mentioned in note 35 supra, many of which are excellent,
perhaps would have a better chance of widespread adoption if they were supported by
studies of actual experience in some of the more enlightened foreign countries.
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upon the central function of the criminal process, the ascertain-
ment of truth.
A. Discovery
The first of these two related topics comes under the heading
of "discovery." The continental systems invariably provide that at
an early stage of the proceedings, and in any event well before the
trial, the defendant and his counsel acquire an absolute and un-
limited right to inspect the entire dossier, that is, all of the evi-
dence collected by the prosecution and the investigating magis-
trate.48 Thus it is simply impossible to obtain a conviction by a
strategy of surprise.49 It must be remembered, moreover, that in
most cases there can be a trial de novo on appeal, which, of course,
acts as a second barrier against the successful use of surprise evi-
dence.
To facilitate inspection of the dossier by defense counsel,
German law provides that upon his request he should normally
be allowed to take the dossier to his office or home for thorough
and unhurried study."
Concerning this latter point, and generally concerning details
of inspection procedure, other continental systems may not go
quite so far as the German Code. But defense counsel's basic right
to timely inspection of the entire dossier has become an article of
faith throughout the civil law world-and, indeed, in the socialist
orbit as well. This is well illustrated by an incident that occurred
during World War II, when representatives of the United States,
Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia met in London to prepare
the Charter of the International Tribunal which later tried the
principal war criminals at Nuremberg. Among other issues of pro-
cedure, the question of discovery came up for discussion. Mr. jus-
48. See Damaska, Barriers, at 533-34. A good example of a code provision spelling
out the details of this right of inspection is STPO § 147.
The prosecutor must include in the dossier every document that contains any
information relating to the investigation; nothing except purely internal instructions
and communications among members of the prosecutorial staff may be kept from the
defendant. See 1 LOEvE-RoSENBERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAs GERICTsvERFAs-
SUNGSGESEZ § 147, anno. 2 (22d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as LomV-RosENBERa (22d
ed.) ].
49. See, eg., Murray, A Survey of Criminal Procedure in Spain and Some Con-
parisons with Criminal Procedure in the United States, 40 N.D.L. Rv. 7, 9, 13 (1964).
50. STPO § 147 (4). "Dossier" does not in this case include physical evidence. The
physical evidence may, however, be inspected. See id. § 147 (1).
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tice Jackson, who attended the meeting as the representative of
the United States, later reported that at that point
the Soviet Delegation objected to our practice on the ground that
it is not fair to defendants. Under the Soviet system when an
indictment is filed every document and the statement of every
witness which is expected to be used against the defendant must
be filed with the court and made known to the defense. It was
objected that under our system the accused does not know the
statements of accusing witnesses nor the documents that may be
used against him, that such evidence is first made known to him at
the trial too late to prepare a defense, and that this tends to make
the trial something of a game instead of a real inquest into guilt.
It must be admitted that there is a great deal of truth in this
criticism. 1
So far as the Nuremberg trial was concerned, the problem was
overcome by a compromise between the common law and civil law
positions. What seems significant beyond the immediate context,
however, is the fact that Mr. Justice Jackson had to listen to, and
did not have much of an answer for, this lecture on due process
delivered by his Soviet counterpart.
In its aversion to unlimited pretrial discovery in criminal
proceedings, the American legal system today stands virtually
alone. In England, the older common law tradition of trial by
surprise has long been abandoned, and present English practice,
by a combination of procedural devices and informal arrange-
ments, permits defense counsel, well before the trial, to become
fully familiar with every element of the facts known to the prose-
cution.5 2
In this country, although we are ahead of the rest of the world
with respect to discovery in civil procedure, we have been remark-
ably slow in taking the blindfolds from the eyes of the criminal
defendant.5 3 Many states have not even begun to devise effective
tools for criminal discovery.54
51. Quoted in Bull, supra note 3, at 178.
52. See Prevezer, England: Pre-Trial Procedure, in THE AccusED-A COMPARATVE
STuDY 21, 24-26 (J. Coutts ed. 1966); ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JuSTICE 158-61 (D.
Karlen, G. Sawyer & E. Wise eds. 1967); Norton, Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 11, 12 (1970), where further authorities are cited.
53. This is so even though there has been no dearth of reform proposals, some of
which are sponsored by prestigious organizations. For a helpful recent survey of current
proposals seeking to liberalize discovery in criminal proceedings, see D. EPsTEIN & D.
Ausmm, supra note 35, at 61-65.
54. The preliminary hearing, in its American form (as distinguished from the
English version), is not an effective discovery device. See Goldstein, The State and the
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The hope that broad criminal discovery would be forced on
the states by the Supreme Court has not been fulfilled. The con-
tours of the limited constitutional right recognized in cases such
as Brady v. Maryland55 are so blurred that-except in cases of out-
rageous suppressive tactics employed by the prosecution-this con-
stitutional doctrine supplies no reliable basis for discovery? °
A few jurisdictions, including the federal courts 7 have pro-
gressed beyond the Neanderthal stage. 8 But under the Federal
Rules the defendant is still precluded from getting a pretrial look
at the most vital materials-the statements made by government
witnesses or prospective government witnesses.0 9 With very few
exceptions,60 state discovery practice in the so-called liberal states is
subject to similar limitations, and in some American jurisdictions
even the names of the People's witnesses cannot be obtained as of
right before trial.61
In no American jurisdiction does the defendant have a right
to continental-style inspection, to discovery routinely obtained and
unlimited in scope. 2
I submit that experience gained under the continental systems
could be exceedingly useful in dealing with the classical anti-dis-
Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1183 (1960); Cf.
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 282 (1972), id. at 292 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover,
under present law the prosecutor can cut off the defendant's right to a preliminary
hearing by securing an indictment. See A.L.I., A MODEL CODE OF PE-ARAiGNMENT PRO-
cEDURE 592 (1975), and authorities cited therein. Nor is the motion to inspect grand
jury minutes a viable discovery tool. See, e.g., Proskin v. County Court, 30 N.Y2d 15,
280 N.E.2d 875, 330 N.YS.2d 44 (1972).
55. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
56. See, e.g., People v. Stridiron, 33 N.Y.2d 287, 292-93, 307 N.E.2d 242, 245, 352
N.Y.S.2d 179, 182-83 (1973). For a thorough discussion of the case law, see Nakell, Criminal
Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considera-
tions, 50 N.C.L. REV. 437 (1972); Comment, Pretrial Discovery Under the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 46 Miss. L.J. 302, 309-10 (1975).
57. See FED. R. Cam. P. 16.
58. The more progressive jurisdictions are listed by Nakell, supra note 56, at 439,
and by Norton, supra note 52, at 16. See also N.Y. CRaM. PROC. LAW art. 240 (McKinney
1971); Note, Criminal Procedure-Discovery-Movement Toward Full Disclosure, 77 W.
VA. L. REV. 561 (1975).
59. See especially FED. R. C~am. P. 16(a)(2), in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. §
3500(a) (1970). To the same effect, see N.Y. CRaM. Paoc. LAw §§ 240.10(3), 240.20(3)
(McKinney 1971).
60. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-203 (1973) (discdvery of names of state's
witnesses). For a discussion of the relatively liberal, judge-made rules prevailing in
California, see D. LouxsEuL & B. WALLY, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY § 14.03 (2d ed.
1972 & Supp. 1975).
61. See Comment, supra note 56, at 317-18.
62. See Damaska, Barriers, at 534.
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covery arguments that continue to mold the attitude of our courts
and legislators. 63 Let us look, first of all, at the "abuse" argument,
which is born of the fear that the defendant, once he is apprised of
the State's evidence, will be enabled to prepare perjured testimony
and to bribe or intimidate, or perhaps even eliminate, the wit-
nesses for the prosecution. It must be conceded that in many situa-
tions, and especially in cases involving organized crime, this danger
is real. American advocates of discovery have replied that the
danger can be minimized by giving the court discretionary power
to issue protective orders.6 4 Quaere, however, whether it is a satis-
factory solution to leave everything to the court's discretion. The
civil law has a better answer to the "abuse" argument. Under the
continental systems-and I shall soon explain this more thoroughly-
the defendant normally will have stated his own version of the facts
in considerable detail at a very early stage of the proceedings. Thus,
at the time when he or his counsel inspects the dossier, his position
has assumed a sufficiently firm shape so that it can no longer be
effectively improved by fabrications .65 The further danger, that
prosecution witnesses might be bribed or intimidated, usually is
neutralized in the civil law systems by the sensible rule that if at
the trial the witness suddenly suffers a loss of memory or seeks to
contradict his prior statements, his previous testimony can be
used not only to assist his power of recall but even as substantive
evidence. 6 A slight modernization of our antediluvian rules of
evidence (including the rule against impeaching one's own wit-
ness) would permit our courts to reach the same result.67
63. For discussion of these arguments, and many further references, see Nakell,
supra note 56, at 442-49, and Norton, supra note 52, at 12-16.
64. See, e.g., Nakell, supra note 56, at 445, 448; Norton, supra note 52, at 14-15.
The Federal Rules already authorize such protective orders. See FED. R. CRim. P.
16(d)(1).
65. It must be remembered that in a continental country the judge presiding
at the trial has the dossier in his hands and is thoroughly familiar with its contents.
Thus, if at the trial the defendant should present a recently fabricated story, the Pre-
siding Justice may remind him of any contradictions between that story and his previous
testimony, or of the fact that he failed to mention the point when he previously talked
with investigating officials. Should the defendant deny the accuracy or completeness of
the portions of the dossier to which the Presiding Justice refers, the officials who recorded
the previous statements of the accused may be called as witnesses. See LOEWE-ROSENBERG
(22d ed.) § 254, anno. 6. Thus, any attempt to change his original position may well
hurt rather than help the defendant, unless the change is satisfactorily explained. Where
the change is a fabrication, it is unlikely that such an explanation can be presented.
66. See LOEWE-ROSENBERG (22d ed.) § 253, anno. 1.
67. These antediluvian rules were applied, assertedly under statutory compulsion,
by the majority of the New York Court of Appeals in the recent case of People v. Fitz-
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To kill or incapacitate a prosecution witness before the trial,
again will not help the defendant at all in a civil law country;
the previous testimony of the witness is recorded in the dossier,
and if the witness in the meantime has become unavailable, this
particular portion of the dossier may be read at the trial. 8
In our system, the problem of utilizing pretrial depositions
is somewhat more difficult because of the constitutional confronta-
tion requirement. But the Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Cali-
fornia v. Green69 makes it clear that, subject to certain safeguards,
the deposition of an unavailable witness may be used at the trial
even under our system. In some situations such use now is author-
ized by the Federal Rules7°
It follows, I submit, that the answers by which the civilians
have neutralized the "abuse" argument against effective discovery
are relevant in our system as well.
The only other respectable argument against unlimited dis-
covery is that of prosecutors crying "one-way-street." Even if one is
free from prosecutorial bias, one must wonder why, in an allegedly
adversary system, one party should have to play with completely
open cards, while the other party-the party who presumably has
the most intimate knowledge of the facts-has the right to sit back
and in effect to limit his utterances to two taunting words: "Prove
it." Some writers have attempted to answer this question within
patrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 351 N.E.2d 675, 386 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1976). More sensible results,
similar to the German approach mentioned in the text accompanying note 66 supra,
have been reached in some other American jurisdictions. See McCoMCK ON EVIDENCE
§§ 38, 39, 251 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the prior
statement can be used for impeachment purposes (rule 607), but under rule 801(d)(1)(A),
as a House-Senate Conference Committee phrased it after long and bitter controversy, it
is admissible as substantive evidence only if originally made under oath. Thus a prior
inconsistent statement, contained in unswor testimony given to the police by a witness
(before he was intimidated or bribed), cannot be used as substantive evidence under
the Federal Rules. Regarding the admissibility of sworn prior statements, see United
States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976).
68. See Damaska, Barriers, at 519-20, and authorities cited therein.
69. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
70. Fa. R. Cmnm. P. 15(e). Note, however, that this rule, although liberal by com-
parison with our traditional approach, is more restrictive than the practice in con-
tinental countries, where even unsworn statements made by the witness to the police
or the prosecutor can be read at the trial if the witness in the meantime has died or if
for other reasons his testimony has become difficult to obtain. See, e.g., STPO § 251 (2).
The restrictions built into rule 15 (e) reflect the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the due process and confrontation clauses. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Keeping in mind, however, the need for the protection of witnesses who are willing to
testify against powerful and ruthless criminals, a strong argument can be made in favor
of the less restrictive German rule.
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the framework of our system,7 1 but their answers have largely
failed to persuade our courts and legislators. As a practical matter,
it does not seem likely that unlimited discovery-the hallmark of
civilized criminal procedure-will be widely and effectively intro-
duced into our system unless the "one-way-street" argument can
be laid to rest. 2 To do that, one must take a fresh look, aided by
comparison, at the whole problem of the defendant's contribution
to the ascertainment of the true facts. This brings me to the final
topic of the present discussion.
B. The Accused as a Source of Information
The role of the accused as a source of information in the truth-
finding process is an important and thorny topic in any system of
criminal procedure. It is also the topic concerning which-upon
superficial inspection-the gap between common law and civil law
appears most unbridgeable.
Closer analysis, however, shows that the rock-bottom principle
that is the foundation of all specific rules in this area of the law
today is shared by virtually all civilized legal systems: no physical
compulsion may be used to make the suspect talk. In this sense,
almost all civilized legal systems give the suspect, even before he
becomes the defendant, the right to remain silent.73 The more
enlightened legal systems, whether of the common law or the civil
law variety, also are in agreement today on the principle that
from the very beginning of the investigation the accused is entitled
to the assistance of counsel.74 It follows that when the suspect, at
71. See, eg., Nakell, supra note 56, at 442-44.
72. The basis of the argument against "one-way-street" discovery is plain enough.
If a criminal proceeding is regarded as essentially a sporting contest between opposing
counsel, it follows that no greater burden of making pretrial disclosures should be
imposed on the prosecution than is imposed on the defense. If, on the other hand, the
ascertainment of truth is perceived as the major and essential objective of such a
proceeding, then it is clear that defendant's silence is at least as inimical to the attain-
ment of that objective as lack of discovery, because "[m]any offenses are of such a
character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
in the crime." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), quoted with approval in
United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 1775 (1976).
73. See Pieck, The Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Civil Law,
11 Am. J. ComP. L. 585 (1962).
74. See, e.g., H. NIEBLER, THE GERmAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77 (1965),
where the following English translation of STPO § 136 (a provision not substantially
changed since the date of the translation) can be found:
At the commencement of the first examination the accused shall be in-
formed of the act with which he is charged and of the applicable penal pro-
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any stage of the proceedings, is called upon to exercise his all-
important option-to talk or not to talk-at least the more en-
lightened legal systems will make it possible for him to be guided
by counsel's advice.
Up to this point, I repeat, there is a large measure of agree-
ment among civilized and enlightened legal systems, regardless of
whether they belong to the common law or the civil law orbit.
Crucial differences, however, come to light when we ask the next
question: Which course will counsel advise the defendant to take?
Under our system, "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect
in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances.1 75 Quite often, counsel will keep his client equally
silent at the trial; indeed, in the many cases where the client has a
criminal record, our rule permitting the prosecution to unearth
such record on cross-examination 76 makes it almost impossible for
counsel to let the defendant take the stand. In its perverse striving
to keep the defendant silent, our law, furthermore, seeks to assure
the defendant and his counsel that legal rules can repeal the laws
of logic, and that by legal rules the jury can be induced not to
draw the natural inferences from defendant's silence. In Griffin v.
California77 the Warren Court-over a powerful dissent by Mr.
Justice Stewart-held that no state may permit intelligent judicial
comment upon defendant's failure to testify.
In thus encouraging the accused to remain silent, our legal
system stands virtually alone. In England, defendants rarely opt
for silence, because English law differs from ours in two crucial
respects. If the accused takes the stand, the English rule is to the
effect that he cannot by reason of that alone be cross-examined as
to previous convictions." And if he remains silent, the judge is
authorized by English law to "suggest to the jury that it draw an
visions. It shall be pointed out to him that the law grants him the right to
respond to the accusation, or not to answer regarding the charge, and at all
times, even before his examination, to consult with defense counsel of his
choice.
75. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring and dis-
senting). See also Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1060,
1064 (1975).
76. See MeComaicx, supra note 67, § 43.
77. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The arguments against this holding are cogently stated
in Justice Stewart's dissent, id. at 617, and even more elaborately in Chief Justice
Traynor's opinion in People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1965).
78. See ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 185.
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adverse inference from the defendant's failure to explain away the
evidence against him. 79
Implementing a similar policy by partly different techniques,
the continental systems likewise discourage the accused from stand-
ing mute. In many (though not all) of those systems the defendant's
silence may serve as corroborating evidence of guilt.8 0 Even where,
as in West Germany, this traditional rule has been modified, a
defendant generally is not well advised to remain silent. At the
very outset of the trial, he has to stand in front of the judges, to be
questioned by the Presiding Justice of the court.8' True, he may
refuse to answer any questions relating to the charges against him;
but he must announce such refusal in open court and cannot
simply, as he might under a common law system, remove himself
from the questioning process by deciding not to take the stand. 2
Moreover, only in the event of a total refusal by the defendant to
answer any questions relating to the charges does German law
prohibit the drawing of inferences from his silence. 8 If he answers
any of such questions, but then refuses to answer others, the court
79. Id. at 184. See also Tierney, Transatlantic Attitudes Toward Self-Incrimination,
6 Am. CRan. L.Q. 26 (1967). The Canadian courts, despite a statutory provision against
comment by the judge, have reached results more consonant with the English than with
the American view on this point. See Ratushny, Is There a Right Against Self-Incrimina-
tion in Canada?, 19 McGiLL L.J. 1, 33-39 (1973).
It is interesting to note that the trend of law reform in Great Britain is to move
even further away from the preconceptions that presently dominate the treatment of
the subject in this country. In June 1972, the British Law Revision Committee in its
Eleventh Report, dealing with evidence, Cmnd. 4991, proposed that at the trial, after
the prosecution has proved a prima fade case and the court has concluded that "there
is a case for the defense to answer," the court should call on the accused to give evidence.
If the accused then remains silent, the prosecutor as well as the judge could comment
on such silence, and the accused's failure to testify could be treated as corroboration.
Id. at 68-70. Pursuant to another proposal made by the same distinguished Committee,
id. at 16-26, an inference adverse to the accused might be drawn from the circumstance
that exculpating facts he tries to prove at the trial have not previously been mentioned
by him to the interrogating authorities.
80. Ten years ago, a thorough comparative study showed that the majority of
civil law (and Scandinavian) legal systems continue to adhere to the rule that the trier
of fact may draw inferences from the silence of the accused. See Jescheck, Rechtsverglei-
chendes Generalgutachten zum Thema "Beweisverbote im Strafprozess," 1 VERHANDLUNGEN
DES 46. DEUTSCHEN JURENTAGES, part 38, at 32-35 (1966). See also Pieck, supra note 73,
at 598-600 (1962) (still valuable, although since its publication a few continental coun-
tries have somewhat modified their rules).
81. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
82. See Damaska, Barriers, at 527-30.
83. Judgment of Oct. 15, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., [1970] BGHSt 23, 342,
summarized in [1971] MDR 15, at 18. See LOEWE-ROSENBERG (23d ed.), Introduction, ch.
14, annos. 33-37.
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may draw logical inferences from his refusal . 4 Thus, selective
silence is strongly discouraged. Total silence of the defendant
(although in theory under the present German rule it does not
support adverse inferences) will occur only rarely in a German
court because it carries with it a grave disadvantage for the
defendant: since there will be no separate hearing regarding the
sentence,8 5 a totally silent defendant may forfeit the opportunity to
present facts tending to mitigate his punishment.8 8
The continental systems, moreover, reject our dysfunctional
rule that previous convictions of the defendant can be proved if,
but only if, he takes the stand. The rules developed in those sys-
tems regarding admissibility of previous convictions are neither
simple nor uniform, but they exhibit unanimity on the crucial
point: the admissibility of previous convictions never hinges on
whether or not the defendant testifies.8 7 Thus he will never be
dissuaded from testifying by the fear that his decision to do so will
open the door to evidence of his criminal record.
Nor does a defendant who decides to testify before a continental
court have to dread that a prosecution for perjury might arise out
of such testimony. What he says in his defense is not under oath. 8
84. Judgment of Dec. 3, 1965, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., [1965] BGHSt 20, 298,
especially at 300. See Maiwald, Zur gerichtlichen Filrsorgepflieht im Straiprozess und
ihren Grenzen, in FEsrscHRI FOR RIcHARD LANGE 745, 757 (1976).
85. See text following note 25 supra.
86. Under German law the questioning of the defendant at the trial is divided
into two phases. See STPO § 243. The first deals with his personal history and gen-
eral circumstances, while the second phase centers on the charges against him. His right
to remain silent comes into play only when the second phase is reached. It follows that
those mitigating facts that relate to defendant's personal history and general circum-
stances (for example, poverty or lack of education) can always be mentioned by him
during the first phase. But mitigating facts connected with the crime itself (for example,
that he was only a minor participant; that he tried to persuade his accomplices not
to hurt the victim; that he is remorseful) cannot be brought out by his testimony if he
decides to remain completely silent during the second phase of the questioning, the
phase dealing with the charges against him.
Defendant's right to have the "last word," STPO § 258, furnishes no substitute for
such testimony. Section 258 makes it clear that whatever the defendant says by way of
his "last word" is not evidence; it is part of the parties' argumentative summing-up,
which according to that provision occurs "after the end of the proof-taking phase of
the trial".
The disadvantage thus suffered by a silent defendant is further accentuated in
those legal systems where a confession in itself would be treated as a mitigating circum-
stance. See, e.g., Huston, A Preliminary Survey of the Criminal Procedure in Thailand,
16 SYRAcusE L. REv. 505, 524-25 (1965).
87. See Damaska, Barriers, at 518.
88. See R.B. SCHLESNGER, supra note 1, at 842 ("In their free evaluation of the
evidence the triers of the facts must weigh the accused's statement along with all
other items of proof; and no adverse inference can be drawn from the fact that the
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Thus the inducement to speak, and not to stand mute, is very
strong in the civil law systems. Experience shows that "almost all
continental defendants choose to testify" at the trial.8 9 This being
so, the accused normally has little to lose and much to gain by
presenting his side of the story not only at the trial, but also in
the earlier phases of the proceeding.s0 If the accused is innocent,
this may lead to an early dismissal of the charges. In any event, the
combination of a talking defendant and unlimited discovery will
clarify the issues well before trial and make the trial both shorter
and more informative-much to the benefit of an innocent de-
fendant.
In cases where the accused is clearly guilty, the same combina-
tion of factors will prove equally potent. Through active colloquies
between the accused and the investigator, combined with inspec-
tion of the dossier, such an accused and his counsel are apt to
become persuaded that a denial of guilt simply will not stand up.
The usual result is a confession, followed by an attempt to present
evidence of mitigating circumstances.
Thus, by combining unlimited discovery for the benefit of the
defense with rules making it advantageous for the accused to talk,
the continental systems have fashioned a highly efficient vehicle
for the ascertainment of truth. If the accused is in fact innocent,
unlimited pretrial discovery will give him the best possible chance
-a much better chance than he would have under a system of trial
by surprise-to meet whatever evidence there may be against him.
And if he is guilty, the unavailability of silence as a viable strategy
will make his conviction more probable and less time consuming.
statement is unsworn, because the accused is not eligible to be put under oath.'). See
also Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARV. L. REv. 683, 696
(1956), and the same author's article cited supra note 29.
There is a fine comparative discussion of the point in an appendix forming part of
the late Judge Jerome Frank's dissenting opinion in United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d
556, 587-92 (2d Cir. 1956). Judge Frank's dissent ultimately prevailed: the decision of
the majority of the court of appeals was unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court,
353 U.S. 391 (1957).
89. Damaska, Barriers, at 527.
90. It should be remembered that in some of the continental countries the pretrial
investigation is conducted by a judge, and that the same judge may have the power
to determine whether the accused should be detained (and remain detained) pending
trial. Thus, at least from the subjective standpoint of the accused, it may well appear
unwise to incur the judge's displeasure by a stubborn refusal to help in clearing up
the facts. The investigating judge is apt to be quite impartial, in the sense that it makes
no difference to him whether the facts he unearths ultimately will show guilt or in-
nocence. But he does have a personal and professional interest in clearing up the case
as expeditiously as possible and may become irritated when he sees his investigation
obstructed.
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IV. THE TEACHINGS OF FOREIGN EXPERIENCE
In appraising the continental principles favoring discovery
and disfavoring silence, 91 we should keep in mind that procedural
and evidentiary rules promoting the ascertainment of truth not
only serve the cause of justice, but at the same time tend to expe-
dite criminal proceedings-a point that seems to me to be of crucial
importance at a time when, because of problems of overload, our
whole system of criminal justice is uncomfortably close to collapse.
That the rules governing the ascertainment of truth have a
powerful impact upon the expeditiousness with which cases flow
through the criminal justice system will become clear to anyone
whb spends just a few hours in a French courtroom. There the
observer will find that although the continental systems do not
recognize a plea of guilty, so that no defendant can be convicted
or sentenced without an actual trial, most criminal cases are
handled with surprising dispatch. A single tribunal, acting without
undue haste, often disposes of 20 or more cases during one morn-
ing. The explanation is that, for reasons I described, the defendants
in the vast majority of cases have confessed prior to the trial, with
the result that the precious hours or minutes of the trial itself can
be devoted almost exclusively to an exploration of the factors
which affect the measure of punishment.92 In this way, the French
system is able to process the ever-growing mass of routine cases
without throwing justice and judicial dignity to the winds-with-
out, in other words, resorting to the plea bargainY3
91. With respect to arrest and pretrial detention (discussed in Section II supra),
the lesson to be derived from comparison is too obvious to require much elaboration,
The discussion that follows in the text therefore will be limited to what foreign experi-
ence can teach us regarding discovery and the treatment of the accused's silence, addressed
in Section III supra.
There are, of course, many other aspects of the criminal process that should be
studied comparatively, so that foreign solutions-often superior to our own-can be
brought to the attention of those responsible for the development of our law. The
recent article on criminal records by Professor SA. Cohn, supra note 33, is an example
of an excellent study of this kind. It may have influenced the ameliorative legislation
just adopted in New York. N.Y. Crim. PRoc. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
The following are random samples of further fruitful topics for such studies: (1) The
accused's right to be heard before he is ordered to stand trial. (2) The exclusionary rule.
See Damaska, Reflections, at 179-80. (3) The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. For
a continental view of the doctrine, see LOEwE-ROSENBERG (23d ed.), Introduction, ch.
14, annos, 40-43. (4) The exonerated defendant's right to recover costs, including reason-
able attorneys' fees. (5) The exonerated defendant's right to compensation for pretrial
detention suffered by him. (6) The victim's right to compensation.
92. See Pugh, supra note 24, at 22-23.
93. Under our present system, defense counsel advises his client to remain silent,
knowing that no inference may be drawn from such silence and that-in contrast to
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From the standpoint of our own legal system, do these com-
parative observations lead to a practical lesson? Surely, wholesale
adoption of one of the continental systems would be neither fea-
sible nor desirable. Yet a practical lesson is learned if in the light
of the comparison we recognize that without the twin principles of
unlimited discovery and discouragement of silence, in an intoler-
ably large number of cases the true facts will remain hidden.
Comparison makes us see more clearly that under our present
system the innocent defendant is in grave danger of being rail-
roaded to jail by surprise evidence, the kind of evidence of which
he would have been forewarned and which (being in fact inno-
cent) he could have torn to shreds under the continental system.
Comparison also teaches us that, while we treat the innocent
defendant unfairly, we lavish too much tenderness upon those
whose only hope lies in suppressing the facts, that is, the guilty. I
am not about to join the company of the many eminent scholars
and judges who have advocated repeal or substantial modification
of the fifth amendment privilege.9 4 It seems to me that, while re-
maining faithful to the existing text of the amendment, we could
and should revise those of our rules which directly discourage the
accused from testifying and encourage him to remain silent. 5
civil law procedure-even a silent defendant can preserve his option to take the stand
until the prosecution has proved a prima facie case at the trial. Thus, no matter how
obvious the defendant's guilt, defense counsel can always force the prosecution to prove
its case without any help from the defendant and without the benefit of any inference
that might be drawn from defendant's silence. It is obvious that if prosecutors attempted
thus to try and prove every case, the criminal justice system would totally collapse. In
the great majority of run-of-the-mill cases, defense counsel's threat to put the prosecutor
to his proof is not made in the honest hope of winning the case on the merits, but
as a form of legalized blackmail, used to obtain a sentence considerably milder than
justice would dictate. Prosecutors, whose staffs and other resources often are not sufficient
to try more than a small fraction of their cases, are forced to submit to this blackmail
by entering into plea-bargains. The fact that in many American communities over 90
percent of all criminal cases presently have to be resolved by this much-lamented
method in itself may furnish a good reason for re-examining our system.
94. Among the most severe critics of the fifth amendment privilege we find men of
the stature of Dean Wigmore, Dean Pound, Mr. Justice Cardozo, and Judge Friendly.
For a more complete roster, and a discussion of the views of these eminent jurists, see
S. Schlesinger, Witness Against Himself: The Self-Incrimination Privilege As Public
Policy, 3 CLAREMorr J. 55, especially at 56-60 (1975).
95. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra. In order to bring about the changes
advocated here, it would be necessary, first and foremost, to overrule the unfortunate
holding of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
One may surmise that the majority of the present Court is no longer completely
sure of the soundness of the majority opinion in Griffin. Even the present Court, how-
ever, in a recent 6-to-S decision showed itself opposed to the drawing of any inferences
from the accused's silence in the face of police interrogation. See Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct.
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Until these revisions are accomplished, our system will remain
suffocated by overload and will continue to underemphasize the
principal objective of the criminal process: the ascertainment of
truth.
I realize, of course, that other values may compete with the
value of truth. The truth may have to remain hidden if it can be
brought out into the open only at the expense of human dignity
or of other values held sacred in our society. But, as English and
continental experience shows, the defendant's dignity is not dimin-
ished, and no other basic values are seriously jeopardized, by rules
which in a civilized manner discourage silence, for example, by a
rule permitting the trier of the facts to draw whatever inferences
may be dictated by logic and reason. 9°
In every system of criminal procedure, the ultimate policy
issues are bound to center on the conflict between the value of
truth and the competing "other values." A comparative approach,
I submit, demonstrates that-for historical and political reasons
that are complex and require further elucidation-the tendency is
stronger in our system than in any other to sacrifice truth to the
"other values. ' 97 This in itself does not prove that the position of
the majority of legal systems is superior to our minority view. But
it does call for reflection and open-minded rethinking of many of
2240 (1976). Concerning this issue, which is more difficult than that posed by Griffin,
the highest court of West Germany in effect reached the same result as the United
States Supreme Court. See Judgment of Oct. 26, 1965, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger.,
[1965] BGHSt 20, 281. Compare, however, as looking in the opposite direction, the
proposals (and the strong supporting arguments) recently made by the British Law
Revision Committee, supra note 79.
96. It has been argued that to permit such inferences would violate the principle
of adversariness. But that so-called principle, which even today we honor only selectively
(see note 11 supra & text following note 24), is not an end in itself. It is a mere tool,
to be employed for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and to be left unused in
situations where it would not serve its purpose. See Tm AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, LAW AND A
CHANGING SocIEry 12 (1975); Oaks, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility,
1975 B.Y.U.L. Rav. 591, 596, quoted with approval in Mr. Justice Powell's majority
opinion in Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, at 3050 n.30 (1976). Even strong proponents of
"process values" will not contend otherwise. See Summers, Evaluating and Improving
Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 13, 43-44 (1974).
97. See Frankel, supra note 10; Oaks, supra note 96. The tendency of our courts
to sacrifice the value of truth to (often ill-defined) "other values" is strikingly illus-
trated by Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Writing for the majority of the
Court, Mr. Justice White recently recognized, and indeed strongly emphasized, the
truth-defeating nature of the Griffin rule. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558
(1976). Despite this recognition, however, the Court merely refused to extend the rule
to prison disciplinary hearings and was not ready to re-examine the rule itself.
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our assumptions, including those which lazy traditionalism would
label as "fundamental."
Such rethinking, using comparison as one of its tools, will
have to begin by classifying every rule of criminal procedure and
evidence as truth-seeking or truth-defeating 5 Every rule (or lack
thereof) recognized as truth-defeating should be seriously re-exam-
ined and should be preserved only if it meets three minimum
requirements: First, the "other value" invoked as overcoming the
value of truth must be clearly spelled out.9 9 Secondly, it must be
shown in the light of reason and experience that the truth-defeat-
ing rule actually serves such other value. 00 And thirdly, the other
value must be found to be so strong that it justifies suppression of
the truth, even though such suppression may lead to conviction of
the innocent or to massive release of the guilty.
As a result of such re-examination, if it is ever undertaken,
our system of criminal procedure will become more rational, more
efficient, more just-and, I strongly believe, quite different from
what it is today.
98. Among the prime examples of truth-defeating rules are the exclusionary
rule, see note 100 infra, and the rule prohibiting the drawing of natural inferences from
the silence of the accused, see note 97 supra. In his majority opinion in Griffin, Mr.
Justice Douglas attempted to justify the latter rule on grounds consistent with the
pursuit of truth by arguing that a defendant who takes the stand can be cross-examined
regarding previous convictions and thus may incur the risk of being found guilty on the
strength of his criminal record. 380 U.S. at 615. With due respect, it must be pointed
out that the argument is specious. Perhaps there is a danger in some cases that the
accused might be convicted on the strength of his previous record, and it may be
arguable that due process requires the court to obviate such danger. But the way to
obviate it is to exclude any evidence relating to prior convictions, and not to prohibit the
drawing of reasonable and logical inferences from defendant's failure to provide informa-
tion.
99. Griffin again comes to mind as an example. The majority opinion in that case
announces a clearly truth-defeating rule, see notes 97, 98 supra, and yet wholly fails
to indicate the nature of the competing values which were thought to overcome the
value of truth.
100. This point is crucial in the ongoing debate concerning the question of
whether and to what extent the Supreme Court should preserve the rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Although it would be tempting to enter into a thorough comparative discussion of
the exclusionary rule, see note 91 supra, limitations of time and space make it impossible
to present such a discussion here. Nevertheless, in connection with the general statement
made in the text, it is interesting to note the Court's own doubts as to whether in the
light of experience the exclusionary rule actually serves its announced principal pur-
pose-the deterrence of unlawful police conduct. See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037,
3048-52 (1976). See also Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion, id. at 3054-55, and
Mr. Justice White's dissent, id. at 3072-74.

